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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the District Court which
alleged that he had suffered harm to his previously repaired
right k11ee, when a door malfunctioned at a store owned and
operated by the Defendant, closed on his right knee and broke a
proxical screw that had been surgically implanted in his leg.
The Complaint was sworn to under oath, and contained
information which stated that there was in fact an eye witness
to the door malfunctioning and closing on his leg.
The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the
District Court granted.
The Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and this
Appeal follows.
For purposes of brevity, the Appellant does now inform this
Court that he has been prevented from filing/copying his legal
pleadings in this case, because the Idaho State Departme11t of
Corrections will not allow him to have any assistance in trying
to conduct legal research into this issue, nor in conducting any
type of general research. Because the Appellant is proceeding as
a Pro-Se litigant, it has prejudiced his case.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the District Court Err When It granted To
The Defendants Summary Judgment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A non-moving party is entitled to have his allegations
taken as truei:. Anderson V. Liberty Lobby Inc., 106 s.ct. 2505,
( 1986).
Reply
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A claim may be dismissed only if "it appears beyond doubt
that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief;'Conley V. Gibson, 355

u.s.

41, at 45-46, 78 s.ct. 99, (1957); Cahill

Insurance Company,

v.

Liberty Mutual

80 F.3d 336, 338, (9th Cir. 1996).

In deciding such a Motion, all material allegations of the
Complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill, at 80 F.3d 338.
Dismissal of an action is only reasonable and proper where
there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient
facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri V.
Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699, (9th Cir. 1988).
"To survive a Motion to Dismiss, a Complaint musttcontain
sufficient facts, accepted as true, to 'State a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face". Ashcroft V. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
674,

(2009), (Omitting Quotations).
''A claim has a facial plausability when the Plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable
inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct as it

is alleged in the Complaint 11 • Bell Atlantic Corporation V. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556, (2007).
In the case before the Court, the Appellant showed/declared
in the Complaint the following facts:
1).

Reply
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That on Mayd!lllia, 2009, while he was exiting a
store, (Broumlin's), " •• the exit door closed
with enough force that it fractured (broke)
proxical screw· in ~ight knee", and
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2).

That, " •• the door at this time was found to be
malfunctioning/defective'.

3).

That, ' 1 • • • the Plaintiff's wife was accompanying
the Plaintiff and was a witness to the entire
event ••• ".

All of the above information comes directly from the original
Complaint. PJ.ease see Clerk's Record on Appeal at page ·i3,
paragraph 1 •
Based upon the fact that the Complaint was sworn to under
Oath, and that the above facts are in fact material facts which
were in dispute, it is clear that the District Court abused it's
discretion when it dismissed the case and granted summary judgment
to the Defendants.
Furthermore, at no time during the pleadings, including the
Summary

Judgment stage, did the Defenaants ever submit any type

of evidence that disproved that the events as depicted for in
the Complaint did nut occur.
In order for the Court to have grauted Summary Judgment to
the Defendants, the Court would have had to find that the following
acts did not happen:
A).

That the Door did not malfunction/was defective
on the date and time in.question; and,

B).

That the door did not b1·eak the proxical screw
in the leg of the Plaintiff; and,

C).

~hat the Plaintiff's wife did not witness the
events or >'ti>~ ~ph:-yee-- :J"'o.;J-e:sv... /l-icUJ,
I

However, the Court did not even address these material facts
as were alleged in the Complaint, and that is error.
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Furthermore, at no time during the Summary Judgment pleadings
did the Defendants ever submit any type of documentation, or any
type of affidavits that showed that in fact the door at the
particular store did not malfunction on the date and time of the
alleged incident in the sworn and verified Complaint.
Because there was no type

of evidence submitted by the

Defendants that showed the door did not malfunction and injure
the knee/leg of the Plaintiff, it was clear error for the Court to
grant to the Defendant their request for summary judgment.
As stated previously, "In Summary Judgment proceedings the
facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the party opposing
the Motion, who is also to be given the benefit of all favorable
inferences that can be drawn". Smith V. Idaho State University
Federal Credit Onion, 103 Idaho 245, 646 P.2d 1016, (1982); Doe

v.

Durtshi, 110 Idaho.466, 716 P.2d 1238, (1986).
It is the position of the Plaintiff/Appellant that the
District Court did not grant to him this benefit, and in doing so
committed error when it granted to the Defendant Summary Judgment
because there was no type of evidence submitted by the Defendant
that over came the presumptions or the inferences that could have
been drawn in the favor of the Plaintiff had the District Court
properly gave to the Plaintiff the benefit of all of his allegations
being true.

(Those as contained in the Complaint).

The Defendant/Respondent have filed a Responding Brief in
this Court, and have admitted that the District Court did not use
the proper standard when ruling upon the Motion for Summary

Reply
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Judgment.
Instead of granting to the non-moving party, (the plaintiff
in this case), the Court placed upon the Plaintiff the burden of
proving, (At the summary judgment stage), what caused his injury.
What caused the injury to the Plaintiff, or, whether or not
it was an action of the Defendants that caused the injury, is a
matter for a jury to decide.
The Plaintiff came forward with a sworn affidavit, which
established that the door at a store, which belongs to the named
Defendants, was not working properly.
It was then upon the Defendants to prove by a standard of
proof, that the door did not improperly close upon his leg.
The Defendants did not bring forward any type of evidence
which

would show that the door did not improperly close upon his

leg. Instead, the Defendants moved for Summary Judgment and the
Court ruled that the Plaintiff needed to hire an expert to prove
causation of his injury.
This is not the true and correct standard of law. The Plaintiff
did

submit an affidavit which clearly established that the door

closed upon his leg. The same affidavit, sworn to under oath, did
establish that this improperly operating door, did reinjure the
leg of the Plaintiff.
The Defendants did not submit to the Court any type of
evidence which showed that this did not occur.
Attached as Exhibit A to this Reply Brief is proof that

Reply Brief of Appellant-5

the doors at the Defendants' store had to be repaired directly
after the time period when the Plaintiff is reporting that he
was injured by the same doors.
The time and the place for calling an expert witness is at
the trial of a case. Not during or before discovery is allowed.
Had proper discovery been implemented, the Plaintiff would
have found that the doors had to be repaired by the Defendants,
and the Court would have been able to be fully made aware of this
fact.
But, because the Defendants initiated a Motion for Summary
Judgment, prior to discovery, the Defendants were able to hide
from the Court, and hide from the Plaintiff, the fact that the
doors in question had to be repaired, which goes directly to the
heart of this case.
CONCLUSION

This Court should remand this case back to the District
Court for further proceedings based upon the information that is
contained within this Appeal; if for no other reason, than the
fact that the District
party,

Court

did not give to the non-moving

(The Plaintiff), all reasonable inferences that could have

been drawn in his favor, thereby not using the correct standard
for granting or denying the Motion for Summary.judgment.
The Plaintiff did place in doubt or did in fact show that there
was material items of evidence in dispute, and therefore the Court
erred when it dismissed the Complaint as was filed.
This Court should remand this case with instructions to allow
a trial by jury.
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DECLARATION OF THE PLAINTIFF
Comes now, Gary B. Holdaway, the Plaintiff herein, who
does declare that the enclosed document is true and correct to the
best of his knowledge and belief, under the United States Code,
Title 28, Section 1746, and the Idaho Code Title 9, Section
1406.

G#-Y B. fh /c/q /j~l/

Gary Holdaway, Appellant

;0/1 /'261<-r
Dated'

/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Comes now, Gary B. Holdaway, the Appellant/Plaintiff herein,
who does now Certify that the enclosed document was served upon
the prospective parties entitled to such service, by depositing a
true and correct copy of the document in the United States Mail,
first class postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
Clerk of the Court
Idaho State Supreme Court
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho
83720
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Ms. Dina Sallak
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 51388
Idaho Falls, Idaho
83405

